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The Unequal Incidence of Non-Standard Employment 
across Occupational Groups: An Empirical Analysis of 
Post-Industrial Labour Markets in Germany and Europe 
 
The paper addresses an often neglected question in labour market research: to which extent 
do outcomes aggregated on the national level disguise occupational diversity in employment 
conditions? In particular, how and why do occupational groups differ with regard to the 
incidence of non-standard employment? To explore these questions, the paper derives a 
detailed occupational scheme from the literature, capturing the variety of labour market 
outcomes within countries. In a second step, the scheme is theoretically linked to the topic of 
non-standard work. It is argued that different degrees of skill specificity across occupational 
groups produce diverging incentives for flexible and long-term employment, respectively. This 
leads to the expectation of (some) service-sector occupations showing stronger tendencies 
towards non-standard employment than those in the industrial sector. Based on European 
and German micro data, the categorisation is used to decompose various labour market 
indicators. The results clearly demonstrate the unequal incidence of non-standard 
employment along the lines of the suggested categorisation. Moreover, the longitudinal 
perspective suggests that traditionally functioning occupational groups will be crowded out by 
more destandardised ones. 
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Introduction 
 
In the academic debate, European labour markets are seen to be in a process of transformation 
(Barbieri, 2009; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009; Bosch et al., 2009). Arguably, the development 
over the past decades has been characterised by two important trends: deindustrialisation and 
the growth of non-standard work. Up to the 1980, many European countries were 
characterised by high shares of industrial employment and relatively standardised working 
conditions. Hallmarks of this traditional employment model were stable career patterns, 
typically within one firm, and sufficient wages with limited dispersion across the workforce. 
This did, of course, never reflect the reality for all workers in the labour market. But with a 
dominant manufacturing sector (often serving as model for other industries), European labour 
markets produced rather egalitarian outcomes. 
With the growth of the service economy, most of these labour markets seemingly lost the 
ability to ensure standardisation of employment relationships and displayed trends towards 
“non-standard” or, as Esping-Andersen (1999: 107) puts it, “lousy jobs”. In the scientific 
literature it is often argued that both developments (deindustrialisation and destandardisation) 
are interrelated. Accordingly, the rise of service jobs, in particular those with low 
productivity, has increased pressure for wage inequality (Esping-Andersen, 1993; Iversen and 
Wren, 1998). Countries which due to institutional rigidities are not able to respond to this 
pressure with greater wage dispersion may respond with an increasing differentiation by 
employment contract, i.e. “dualisation” between permanent and temporary work (DiPrete, et 
al., 2006; Palier and Thelen, 2010; King and Rueda, 2008). 
Hence, it is usually assumed that deindustrialisation and service sector growth are important 
factors driving changes towards more unequal labour market outcomes, be it in terms of 
wages or employment contract. This implies that beyond labour market indicators aggregated 
at the national level, we can expect to observe marked differences across sectors and 
occupations within countries (Eichhorst and Marx, 2010; Häusermann and Schwander, 2009). 
However, this is not reflected in the typical research design of comparative labour market 
studies focusing on national cases or regimes (e.g. Auer and Cazes, 2003; Baranowska and 
Gebel, 2010; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009; Bosch et al., 2009; Kahn, 2007; Muffels and Luijkx, 
2008; Schmid, 2007). Within-country variation is usually only accounted for, if at all, by 
controlling for industries. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the role of occupational heterogeneity for changes in 
European labour markets, an often neglected topic in comparative labour market research.   3
The underlying hypothesis is that the ongoing trend of a growth in non-standard work 
proceeds asymmetrically, with (some) service-sector occupations being more heavily affected 
than those in the industrial sector. In this paper the term non-standard work is used in a 
broader sense. It denotes all deviations from what is usually understood to be a standard work 
contract, i.e. permanent employment with decent wages and social security coverage. Thus, it 
covers temporary as well as low-pay work, but not part-time (which excludes many women 
working voluntarily part-time but sharing all other elements of standard employment). 
The observation of varying degrees of non-standard work across occupations is, of course, not 
new (e.g. Bosch and Lehndorff, 2005), but it raises empirical and theoretical questions which 
have not been addressed systematically in the current literature. First of all, the service sector 
is an extremely heterogeneous category comprising occupations with very different skill 
requirements and work environments. Since the service sector is obviously too broad a 
category to study differences in labour market patterns, the primary aim of this article is to 
identify relevant occupational cleavages. Thus, its first contribution is a differentiated 
categorisation of diverging occupational “employment logics” with regard to non-standard 
work. 
The second, far more ambitious question is how to explain the unequal incidence of non-
standard work across occupational groups. Which characteristics of occupations produce 
theses differences? Clearly, the chances to obtain a decent (i.e. standard) employment contract 
are determined by the worker’s productivity (Kahn, 2007). However, this holds true for the 
entire labour market and cannot account for occupational or sectoral differences. Drawing on 
insight in the literature on post-industrial class schemes, I argue that employees cannot only 
be distinguished by their productivity, but also by the “work logic” they follow (Kitschelt and 
Rehm, 2006; Oesch, 2006). I argue that the major difference between workers is whether they 
are integrated into large organisations and complex divisions of labour or whether they 
predominantly perform tasks independently. Related to this, workers can either have skills 
which are bound to a specific context or general ones which are applicable in many jobs and 
occupations. In contrast to general skills, specific skills are seen to lead to a higher stability 
orientation on the side of employers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). The argument here is that 
individualised occupations with rather general skills, which are characteristic for some service 
industries, can be expected to have a stronger tendency towards flexibility and therefore non-
standard work. 
The article adds to the literature in two ways: first, by specifying which occupational clusters 
underlie the often assumed link between deindustrialisation and labour market change towards   4
non-standard employment, and second, by providing an explanation for these differences 
based on the organisation of the work process and skill specificity.  
The article is structured as follows. The first section derives a theoretically grounded 
occupational categorisation from the literature and discusses its relevance for the topic of non-
standard employment. The empirical part applies the categorisation on two levels: first, its 
relevance is demonstrated in a cross-country framework based on data from the EU Labour 
Force Survey (EU LFS). Second, based on more detailed national panel data from Germany, a 
finer-grained analysis of employment patterns is conducted. Besides contract type, this allows 
including important aspects such as wages, job stability and social security coverage. 
Germany is appropriate as an “illustrative example”, since it is seen as a major case of labour 
market flexibilisation by means of non-standard employment (Palier and Thelen, 2010). A 
final section concludes. 
 
Explaining the unequal incidence of non-standard employment: How to categorise? 
 
Assuming an unequal incidence of non-standard employment across segments of national 
labour markets leads to the question how to define the dividing lines. Generally, a sectoral 
perspective (e.g. NACE) is not suitable, since it does not make a hierarchical differentiation, 
e.g. by required skills. Hence, the industry alone provides incomplete information on the 
status of a worker. At higher levels of aggregation, occupational categorizations (e.g. ISCO) 
are too broad and many groups comprise quite heterogeneous occupations. This may disguise 
substantial differences in labour market outcomes. If a finer-grained level is chosen, such as 
ISCO three or four-digit codes, the analysis becomes overly complex with case numbers by 
category being rather small in most data sets.  
A good starting point for a theoretically substantiated classification is provided by the 
discussion on social classes in the service economy (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; 
Esping-Andersen, 1993; Goldthorpe, 1982; Häusermann and Schwander, 2009; Kitschelt and 
Rehm, 2006; Oesch, 2006). This literature basically argues that the status in the labour market 
demarcates social classes which share political interests or a common identity. While in a 
traditional version, this primarily means an antagonism between manual workers, the middle 
class and capital owners, recent contributions propose more differentiated schemes accounting 
for the occupational heterogeneity of post-industrial societies (e.g. Kriesi, 1998; Müller, 
1999).    5
A widely cited framework by Oesch (2006: chap. 5) proposes to categorise occupations 
according to two dimensions. The first (vertical) one is the skill level, which determines how 
“valuable” a worker is from the employer’s perspective. The higher the skill level, the more 
favourable the employment relationship is expected to be for the worker. Secondly, the 
workforce in post-industrial economies is structured horizontally along the “work logic”. 
Underlying dimensions of this distinction are the setting of the work process (including the 
tasks primarily performed), the relations of authority or command structure, the primary 
orientation of the worker (towards customers, the organisation or the professional community) 
and the types of required skills (ibid.: 64). Based on these dimensions, three different work 
logics are distinguished. First, the “technical work logic” is related to the manufacturing of 
goods, be it the production itself or a superordinate task such as development or supervision. 
The “organisational work logic” comprises administrative and clerical tasks on different 
hierarchical levels in bureaucratic organisations. Finally, the “interpersonal work logic” 
applies to occupations that involve personal interaction with customers, in particular the 
provision of personal and social services. The distinct characteristics of the work logics are 
developed in greater detail below. Combining the two dimensions (work logic and skill level) 
leads to a 3x3 matrix and nine occupational groups
1  (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Occupational groups and typical occupations (in italics) 
Skill  Technical work logic  Organisational work logic  Interpersonal work logic 





artist, lawyer, teacher 
Medium Skilled  crafts 





Low Routine  operatives 




cleaner, salesperson  
Source: Modified scheme based on Oesch (2006: 68 and 222). Agricultural occupations and armed forces are 
omitted.  
 
It has to be stressed that the class literature is mainly interested in variables such as social 
identity and political preferences, which are rather remote from this article’s focus on non-
standard employment. However, what underlies the shared interests of occupational groups 
are – at least to a certain extent – similar risk patterns and distributional outcomes in the 
labour market (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006; Häusermann and Schwander, 2009). So while the 
                                                 
1 Based on Oesch’s (2006: 68 and 222) collapsed scheme (without adjusting for education). Two modifications 
were made: first, self-employed are not treated as a separate group, but integrated in the category matching their 
activity. Self-employment can serve as a functional equivalent to other non-standard jobs and therefore are a 
relevant aspect of occupational employment patterns. Second, agricultural occupations and armed forces are 
omitted.   6
class literature uses occupational groups as an explanatory variable because of related 
employment patterns, I am interested in the employment patterns themselves. The focus on 
employment-related risks makes class schemes a plausible starting point for this study.  
How exactly is the occupational scheme presented above related to the incidence of non-
standard work? As for the vertical differentiation by skill level, the answer is straightforward. 
Such employment can be usually seen as an inferior status in the labour market. Thus, one 
would expect workers with low skills (and a weak position in negotiations) to be 
overrepresented in this segment (Kahn, 2007). The expectations for the horizontal structure 
(work logic) are less intuitive. I argue that different “stability orientations” of employers 
prevail in the three work logics creating diverging incentives to offer non-standard 
employment contracts. These, in turn, are primarily explained by the type of skills required in 
an occupation. 
The distinction between specific and general skills has a long-standing tradition in the social 
sciences (e.g. Becker, 1964; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). Specific 
skills are bound to a particular context (e.g. the firm) and are not transferable. For workers 
such skills create the threat of sunk costs in case of job loss, but they are also consequential 
for employers’ optimal human resource practices. The dual labour market theory of the 1970s 
and 1980s identified skill specificity as a crucial variable explaining different degrees of 
exposure to the market mechanism across workers. While specialised workforces are 
integrated into internal labour markets offering stable careers, workers without specific skills 
are exposed to external markets and are used to absorb fluctuations in demand (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971: chap. 2; Piore, 1980). In terms of its economic function, this older dualism 
between external and internal markets largely corresponds to the more recent differentiation 
by employment contract (Rosenberg, 1991), in particular when strict dismissal protection for 
regular worker is in place. The major difference is that many countries nowadays regulate 
secondary employment with a distinct legal framework (e.g. fixed-term contracts). Based on 
dual labour market theory, one could thus argue that the distribution of standard and non-
standard contracts is influenced by the types of skills. In a stylised fashion, the former can be 
seen as a means of stabilising specific human capital, the latter as an option to flexibly employ 
workers without specific skills. 
The reason for the differentiation by skill type is that, analogously to the worker’s hold-up 
problem, employers face difficulties to replace a specifically trained worker, especially when 
they contributed to human capital investment (Busemeyer, 2009). Thus, specific skills create a 
mutual interest in long-term employment relationships (Emmenegger, 2009), which should   7
foster employers’ propensity to offer stability-oriented contracts (with permanent duration, 
seniority pay, etc.). Workers with low or general skills, however, make a more flexible 
contractual arrangement attractive to the employer.  
Polavieja (2005; 2006) challenges dual labour market theory’s usefulness for explaining the 
incidence of temporary employment by showing empirically that such work is not limited to 
low-skilled occupations, but affects high-skilled professionals as well. However, in his 
argument he refers to the hierarchical differentiation by skill level only, without accounting 
for varying degrees of skill specificity across work logics (the horizontal differentiation 
suggested in this paper). If it is acknowledged that these variations exist (and that high-skill 
occupations can have rather general human capital), his findings are not at odds with the basic 
argument of dual labour market theory. 
As I argue below, there are in fact reasons to expect different degrees of skill specificity 
across work logics, variation across countries and production models notwithstanding 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). With some simplification, it can be argued that the interpersonal 
work logic stands out in this respect. Most importantly, it represents an extensively 
individualized segment where “orders will come more from customers than from bosses” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 106). Hence, the work process mainly consists of personal 
interactions with clients. It usually demands a high degree of social competencies, in 
particular communicative ones (plus varying degrees of expertise, depending on the skill 
level). Such competencies are very general and therefore portable across jobs and 
occupations. Moreover, most tasks within the interpersonal work logic are performed 
individually, i.e. independent of location, equipment and co-workers. Service providers 
basically rely upon their personal skills, which usually do not have to be integrated in a 
complex division of labour (Oesch, 2006: 64), but in many cases can be offered by single 
entrepreneurs. Hence, this logic predominantly involves skills which are not bound to a 
specific organisation or even a particular occupation.  
This does also apply to academics. Knowledge-intensive and creative service industries are 
typically characterised by a rather low stability orientation on the part of employers in order to 
be adaptable to radically changing demands. Rather than permanence, the employment 
relationship offers work experience, adding to general skills and external “employability” 
(Collins, 2006). Marsden (2010) points to the consequences of such employment patterns in 
high-skilled knowledge-intensive service industries for individual work biographies. 
Accordingly, entrants in this segment have to participate in “extended entry tournaments” 
dividing workers into winners and losers with the latter being persistently kept from stable   8
employment. Such “unstructured” career paths demand more individual efforts and skill 
investments. This perspective supports the expectation that the interpersonal work logic goes 
along with more flexible employment relationships, also on high skill levels. It is noteworthy, 
however, that unstructured career tracks do not lead to lower remuneration, as more risky 
careers are usually compensated with wage premiums – at least for winners of entry 
tournaments (ibid.: 4). 
The expectations are quite different for the technical work logic. Jobs that are concerned with 
the development and production of goods tend to benefit to a higher degree from tenure and 
tacit knowledge on the specific product, particularly in high value-added manufacturing. This 
is the case, for instance, because special machines are involved or because of incremental 
innovation processes based on long-standing exchange with customers. Moreover, economies 
of scale and the complexity of the production process usually bind the technical work logic to 
larger organisational units. Performing tasks in attuned teams may entail a further aspect of 
specificity, especially as the interaction is typically associated with informal on-the job 
learning (Doeringer and Piore, 1971: 22). Because the technical work logics is associated with 
larger production units and rather specific skills, it is biased towards “structured” career paths 
in internal labour markets (Marsden, 2010). Only expected tenure and within-firm job 
progression make joint investments in human capital possible. 
The expectations for the organisational work logic with regard to skill specificity are less 
clear. The main competencies are coordinative and clerical, and therefore probably more 
portable (and replaceable) than in the technical logic. However, by definition, such 
occupations are located in larger bureaucratic organisations (Oesch, 2006: 64), which have 
specific work processes and divisions of labour. Very often these organisations have 
idiosyncratic tasks, regulations or technologies, which bind work experience to a specific 
context. One example would be the use of software specifically designed for the purposes of 
an organisation. Hence, similar to the technical work logic, one can expect structured careers 
and internal labour markets to play an important role in the organisational logic. Public 
administration is a case in point. 
The upshot is that due to different degrees of skill specificity, we can expect the “stability 
orientation” in the organisational and technical work logic to be higher than in the 
interpersonal work logic. As the interpersonal work logic by tendency is associated with 
individualised and project-based work as well as more general skills, flexible forms of 
employment are relatively attractive in this realm. Thus, two hypotheses can be extracted 
from the discussion:    9
Hypothesis 1: On the vertical dimension, the incidence of non-standard work varies across 
skill levels, with routine jobs being less stable and more exposed to temporary contracts as 
well as low wages. 
 
Hypothesis 2: On the horizontal dimensions, the incidence of non-standard work varies across 
work logics. For high- and medium-skilled occupations, the interpersonal work logic is 
expected to exhibit less stability and more temporary contracts, but not lower wages. 
 
Two qualifications are in order. First, the above framework is clearly a stylised one, 
disguising considerable heterogeneity of occupations within work logics. Thus, occupational 
groups are far from being deterministic predictors of labour market outcomes. The scheme 
represents a parsimonious and theoretically-grounded heuristic device; whether it is 
meaningful is an empirical question. Second, the impact of membership in an occupational 
group may be subject to a “societal effect”. Employment patterns could differ across countries 
due to institutional factors and production models (Bosch and Lehndorf, 2005; Esping-
Andersen, 1999: chap. 7). While this question is beyond the scope of the present article, it 
poses a challenge for future research on the subject. 
Bearing these qualifications in mind, the subsequent sections will attempt at establishing the 
empirical relevance of occupational groups for comparative labour market research in general 
and the incidence of non-standard employment in particular. 
  
Occupational employment patterns in a comparative perspective 
 
Initially, the occupational scheme presented in table 1 is applied to a selected number of EU-
15 countries. The sample is chosen in such a manner that it covers the largest member states 
and all welfare regimes. Unfortunately, the data source (EU LFS) does not provide 
information on relevant aspects (e.g. pay and mobility). Thus, the comparison is restricted to 
the incidence of non-standard work contracts, defined here as either fixed-term or agency 
work or part-time below 15 hours per week. Such “marginal” part-time is included, since it 
can be expected to generate only low earnings and because it is not covered by unemployment 
insurance in some countries.  
Figure 1 shows a considerable occupational heterogeneity in all countries. As predicted by 
hypothesis 1, routine occupations exhibit the highest shares within each work logic in most 
cases (an exception is Spain, where skilled crafts and office have equally high shares).   10
Moreover, the descriptive data partly lends support to hypothesis 2. In each country the share 
of non-standard employment among socio-cultural professionals exceeds levels in the two 
other high-skilled groups (technical experts and managers). In five out of six countries they 
are even higher than the shares among the medium-skilled occupations of the other logics. 
While this confirms the expectations for the interpersonal work logic, skilled services do not 
exhibit higher shares of non-standard contracts than their counterparts in the other logics (this 
is only true for Sweden). Hence, the interpersonal work logic appears more polarised in terms 
of non-standard employment with higher shares in both high- and low-skilled occupations. 
 
Figure 1: Share of atypical workers (temporary contracts and marginal part-time
a) by 
occupational group























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Germany UK France Italy Spain Sweden




Source: EU LFS 2008.  
Note: Results for France should be interpreted with caution due to high number of missing values (ca. 5% of the 
sample).
a defined as part-time with <15h per week; 
b based on the modified scheme of Oesch (2006) presented in 
table 1. Some further modifications were necessary as only three-digit ISCO codes were available (STATA 
codes can be obtained from the author upon request). 
 
The descriptive overview provides some preliminary evidence that the suggested 
categorisation identifies meaningful occupational patterns in terms of non-standard 
employment. The results are in line with the theoretical expectation of a stronger reliance on 
non-standard work in the interpersonal work logic, although this could only be confirmed for 
academic and routine occupations. Moreover, the data points to significant country 
differences concerning the overall level and distribution of non-standard work. 
Notwithstanding these differences, however, Figure 1 also shows that occupational gaps are 
present in all countries and that they exhibit a largely comparable structure. This suggests the   11
insights of the following case study on Germany to be potentially relevant for other countries 
as well. 
  
Occupational employment patterns in Germany: Employment contracts and wages 
 
Turning now to the German case allows using a more detailed data source (the German Socio-
Economic Panel, GSOEP) and additional indicators. Table 2 presents some basic 
characteristics of the occupational groups in Germany. The largest group is the one of 
managers and administrators, followed by socio-cultural professionals and skilled crafts. The 
development over time illustrates the process of deindustrialisation: since the mid-1990s the 
most dynamically growing occupations can be found in the service sector (particularly socio-
cultural professionals), while the only group with significant losses is the one of skilled crafts. 
Concerning the skill composition, the technical and organisational work logics have their 
smallest employment shares in routine occupations. The interpersonal work logic has a 
polarised employment structure with only a small proportion of medium-skilled jobs. A 
similar tendency can be observed in the other logics as well, where the medium-skilled groups 
have been shrinking since 1995.  
 
Table 2: Types of employment in occupational groups, 1995 and 2008 
  % (change since 1995) 











Technical experts  10 (0)  77 (-2)  12 (+1)    8 (+1) 
Skilled crafts  15 (-5)  74 (-4)  10 (+1)  10 (+4) 
Routine operatives    8 (0)  74 (-11)    0 (-1)  24 (+13) 
Managers/admin.  20 (+1)  75 (0)  15 (-2)    8 (+4) 
Skilled office  10 (-2)  79 (-3)    1 (0)  14 (+5) 
Routine office    3 (+1)  69 (-18)    1 (0)  27 (+14) 
SC professionals  15 (+4)  62 (-8)  16 (+2)  20 (+8) 
Skilled services    4 (+1)  67 (-12)  11 (+3)  13 (+6) 
Routine services  14 (+2)  61 (-14)    3 (+2)  33 (+12) 
Total  98 (+1)  69 (-7)  10 (+1)  18 (+8) 
Source: GSOEP 1995 and 2008.  
Notes: 
a  Does not add up to 100% due to omitted categories (agriculture, armed forces); 
b including non-
marginal part-time (self-defined); 
c including fixed-term contracts, agency work (only 2008) and marginal part-
time (self-defined).  
 
The distribution of standard and non-standard employment resembles that of figure 1: routine 
operatives as well as socio-cultural professionals exhibit particularly high shares of the latter. 
It is worth noting that socio-cultural professionals, in addition to an above-average share of   12
non-standard work, have the highest portion of self-employment. This culminates to a rather 
low incidence of permanent employment in this group. 
The development over time shows that the dynamically growing groups also tend to be the 
ones with the highest shares or growth of non-standard contracts (except for routine 
operatives). Accordingly, shifts in the occupational composition appear to be a relevant factor 
underlying change of the German employment model. This is illustrated in figure 2, which 
plots trends in overall as well as permanent employment for each group against each other. It 
clearly shows the higher dynamic in those groups that at the same time drift towards a 
fragmented employment model. Thus, change in the German labour market proceeds anything 
but uniform across occupations. Rather, occupations increasingly characterised by non-
standard work (interpersonal work logic and routine office) seem to be in a process of 
crowding-out more stable and homogeneous groups (in particular skilled crafts and office).  
 
Figure 2: Share of permanent contracts and share in total employment (1995=100) by 
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Share in employment (1995=100)  
Source: SOEP 1995 and 2008 
 
Besides the employment contract, relative wage levels are an important aspect for assessing 
the quality of employment. Table 3 presents three indicators. The median gross hourly wage, 
unsurprisingly, reflects skill levels in each group. Beyond that, it is difficult to interpret, since 
the composition of the groups is not known. It indicates routine services to be characterised 
by rather low wages, also in comparison to other low-skilled occupations. Large differences 
can be observed with regard to the standard deviation. Wage dispersion is relatively low in the 
technical as well as in the organisational work logic. This reflects the effect of public sector   13
pay schemes and the rather high collective bargaining coverage in relevant sectors. In 
Germany collective bargaining coverage is high in manufacturing as well as in public and 
non-commercial services, but relatively low in market-related services (Eichhorst and Marx, 
2010). Accordingly, wage dispersion among socio-cultural professionals is much higher than 
in any other group. This can be interpreted as a first evidence for the effect “entry 
tournaments” on the relative pay of high-skilled service sector workers. Compressed wages in 
skilled and routine services reflect concentration on the lower end of the wage scale, as is 
revealed by their large low-pay share. The same holds for routine operatives and office. For 
these groups the absence of a statutory minimum wage in Germany seems to matter. Over 
time the lower tiers in each logic drifted in the direction of more wage flexibility. However, 
the development since 1995 suggests that the overall increase of low-pay work is again 
predominantly driven by the expanding occupational groups of the service sector. 
 
Table 3: Gross hourly wages in salaried employment by occupational group, 2008 






(change since 1995) 
Technical experts  19.6    9.6    8 (+4) 
Skilled crafts  13.8    5.7  18 (+1) 
Routine operatives  12.1    6.1  29 (+9) 
Managers/admin.  16.3  10.3    9 (+1) 
Skilled office  13.8    7.2  18 (+2) 
Routine office  12.1    4.7  23 (+10) 
SC Professionals  16.3  22.4    9 (0) 
Skilled services  11.3    5.0  30 (+7) 
Routine services    9.2    5.5  41 (+6) 
Total 13.9  11.3  19  (+3) 
Source: GSOEP 1995 and 2008. 
Notes: 
a Below 67% of median. The thresholds are EUR 9.3 (2008) and EUR 7.6 (1995).
 
 
So far the analysis has only examined descriptive data but has not been able to account for the 
composition of the groups by age and gender. Table 4 presents regression analyses for the 
incidence of permanent contracts and (gross hourly) wage levels as dependent variables. 
Permanent contracts (rather than permanent full-time contracts) are used to avoid a strong 
effect of regular part-time, which is not necessarily to be seen as involuntary non-standard 
work. The sample includes all dependent employees aged 15-64, except for apprentices. As 
explanatory variables, dummies for the occupational categories are used. Besides age, age 
squared and gender, a public sector dummy is included as a control variable. The skill level is 
not controlled for, as it is reflected already in the occupational categories.    14
The controls have significant effects in the expected direction. Age increases the odds of 
having standard contracts and wages. The same is true for the public sector dummy, while 
being female is associated with a wage gap and lower chances of holding a standard contract. 
Concerning the occupational groups, the regression analyses confirm the descriptive 
observations. In comparison to the reference category (skilled crafts) routine operatives, 
socio-cultural professionals and routine services show significantly lower likelihoods of 
holding a permanent contract (routine office is only weakly significant). The only group with 
a significantly higher likelihood is the one of managers and administrators. This supports the 
initially formulated hypotheses: low-skilled workers, as well as the interpersonal work logic 
(except for the medium skill level), have more flexible contractual arrangements than 
traditional manufacturing occupations. 
 
Table 4: Regression analysis: odds of having a permanent contract, logarithm of gross hourly 
wage and tenure 








Constant  -    1.275  - 4.589
*** 
Age   1.28
***    0.056
***    0.261
*** 
Age² 1.00
*** -  0.006
*** -  0.003
** 
Female 0.50
*** -  0.259
*** -  1.681
*** 
Public sector  1.59
***    0.045
**    4.206
*** 
Occupation (ref: Skilled crafts)       
Technical experts  1.35    0.394
*** -  0.235 
Routine operatives  0.50
*** -  0.082
*** -  1.526
*** 
Managers and administrators  1.49
**    0.323
***    0.195 
Skilled office  1.06    0.175
***    1.340
** 
Routine office  0.61
*    0.070
* -  1.331 
Socio-cultural professionals  0.45
***    0.330
*** -  2.562
*** 
Skilled services  0.91  - 0.153
*** -  0.837 
Routine services  0.39
*** -  0.215
*** -  3.481
*** 
N  8,642    7,625    8,637 
(Pseudo) R²  0.12    0.30    0.35 
Source: GSOEP 2008 (***=significant on 1%-level **= 5%  *=10%). 
Notes: The sample includes all dependent employees aged 15-64 except for apprentices; 
a binary logistic 
regression (odds ratios); 
b OLS regression. 
 
As for the wage regression, all categories deviate significantly from skilled crafts (routine 
office only at the ten percent level). After the gender wage gap is controlled for, skilled and 
routine office occupations pay even higher wages on average than skilled crafts. Skilled and 
routine services, as well as routine operatives, exhibit significant wage gaps. As expected, the 
interpersonal work logic is thus associated with on average lower levels of remuneration. 
What is important, however, is the significant wage premium for socio-cultural professionals,   15
which is approximately as large as the ones in other academic occupations. Accordingly, this 
group is more likely to work under flexible contracts, but on average the wage level is similar 
to comparable workers in other logics. This confirms the expectations formulated in 
hypothesis 2. 
 
Employment stability and social protection 
 
The topics of employment stability and atypical employment are clearly related, since short-
term contracts are expected to produce more fragmented work biographies. Hence, the 
different occupational employment patterns observed in the previous sections could go along 
with diverging unemployment risks. As a first indicator, table 5 presents the average number 
of months in unemployment per occupational group over a three-year period. Accordingly, 
workers in routine and skilled services, as well as routine operatives, are, on average, 
particularly exposed to unemployment. As this indicator is heavily influenced by long-term 
unemployed entering an occupation (which is more frequently happening in low-skilled 
occupations), it is also interesting to investigate the stability of employment relationships, 
which is expressed by average tenure (table 5). It was hypothesised that, besides routine 
occupations, the interpersonal work logic is particularly unstable. Hence, we would expect 
lower tenure in this segment, also for high-skilled individuals. At first glance, the descriptive 
indicator does not reveal such differences. With the exception of routine services, the average 
of all groups lies in a relatively small range between nine and twelve years. Socio-cultural 
professionals and skilled services have somewhat lower tenure, but on average the distance is 
not dramatic. 
However, the average tenure in an occupation is heavily influenced by the group’s 
composition, especially with regard to age and public sector employment. To control for these 
effects and to establish whether differences are significant, table 4 presents results of an OLS 
regression of tenure on occupational group dummies. Controlling for the age structure, gender 
and public sector employment shows some significant effects. As was the case for the 
incidence of permanent contracts, hypothesis two can be confirmed for the high and low-skill 
segment of the interpersonal work logic only. Hence, socio-cultural professionals as well as 
routine service workers stay significantly shorter with a firm than the reference category 
(skilled crafts), but not skilled service workers. For the other groups there are little significant 
deviations from the reference category. This confirms that, with the exception of routine   16
operatives, tenure patterns are relatively homogeneous in the technical and organisational 
work logic. 
 
Table 5: Unemployment, tenure and unemployment insurance coverage by occupational 
group 





Eligibility to  
ALG I (%)
b 
Technical experts  0.8  11.2  85 
Skilled crafts  1.6  11.2  88 
Routine operatives  2.9   9.8  87 
Managers/admin. 1.0  12.0  80 
Skilled office  1.4  11.5  91 
Routine office  1.9   9.2  79 
SC Professionals  1.1  10.4  77 
Skilled services  2.4  10.3  73 
Routine services  3.3   7.7  66 
Total 1.8  10.3  79 
Source: GSOEP 2006-2009. 
Notes: 
a In a three-year period (January 2005 - December 2007); 
b based on 2007-08 data. 
 
A further important topic related to employment stability is unemployment insurance 
coverage. As stressed in the literature on new social risks, traditional welfare states may be ill-
suited to protect post-industrial employment relationships against the risk of unemployment. 
The main obstacle is the link between benefit eligibility and previous employment record 
based on the assumption of a continuous “industrial” work biography (Bonoli 2007; Clasen 
and Clegg 2006). In recent years work requirements in many Bismarckian welfare states have 
even been tightened due to increasing cost concerns. As a consequence, more and more 
unemployed are eligible to only second-tier unemployment assistance (Palier 2010). This also 
applies to Germany, where unemployed are either eligible to earnings-related unemployment 
insurance (ALG I) or to a significantly less generous and means-tested basic income scheme 
(ALG II). Thus, the information to which kind of benefit a worker would be eligible in the 
case of unemployment is an important indicator for the precariousness of employment in a 
dynamic perspective. 
With the SOEP it is not possible to model eligibility precisely due to incomplete information 
for periods between surveys. Yet it can be approximated reasonably well. In Germany 
eligibility to ALG I requires 12 months of employment subject to social insurance 
contributions in the previous 24 months. Marginal part-time up to a monthly wage of EUR 
400 (Minijobs) and self-employed are excluded. In the SOEP there is no information on a job 
being subject to social insurance contributions, but it provides the number of months per year 
in salaried employment, which excludes self-employment. Moreover, for each month it can be   17
determined whether respondents worked exclusively in a Minijob. Civil servants are not 
covered by unemployment insurance and therefore excluded from the sample. 
Based on this information from two consecutive waves (adding up to the assessment period of 
24 months) an indicator for unemployment insurance eligibility can be constructed. More 
precisely, it expresses the hypothetical eligibility to ALG I for those employed at the time of 
the 2008 survey, based on the employment record in 2007 and 2008. Eligible are only those 
who work 12 months or more in salaried employment (excluding Minijobs, but including 
parental leave and military/civil service). Respondents who do not fulfil this criteria are 
assumed not to be eligible to ALG I.  
The results
2 are presented in table 5. Hypothetical eligibility is relatively high in the technical 
work logic and particularly in the skilled office group. Managers and administrators as well as 
socio-cultural professionals have somewhat lower rates, which is to be explained from high 
shares of self-employed (table 2). The same is true, to a lesser extent, for skilled services. The 
group clearly standing out is the one of routine services where - based on their current 
employment record - only around two-thirds would be eligible for ALG I. The other 
indicators suggest this to be the effect of predominantly fragmented or marginal employment. 
Hence, for the German case the analysis lends support to the claim that Bismarckian welfare 




This study aimed at enhancing the discussion on growing non-standard work in European 
labour markets by offering a differentiated perspective accounting for occupational diversity 
within countries. As a heuristic tool capturing this variety, an occupational categorisation was 
derived from the literature. The paper’s rather explorative contribution was to illustrate the 
empirical relevance of this categorisation on the German case, thereby showing that 
occupational heterogeneity is an important aspect for comparative research on non-standard 
employment. The two hypotheses guiding the analysis were largely confirmed. Low-wage 
work, temporary employment and instable work biographies are mainly characteristics of 
low-skilled jobs. Moreover, the analysis revealed somewhat less intuitive differences across 
work logics. By and large, the interpersonal work logic appears as a labour market segment in 
which deviations from the traditional employment model are most pronounced. Compared to 
                                                 
2 There are some inconsistent results, presumably because some respondents misreport Minijobs as regular 
salaried employment (which makes it impossible to disentangle the two). Although the effect is fairly small, the 
indicator should only be seen as an approximation.   18
the standard observed in medium-skilled manufacturing jobs, this was expressed in a 
significantly higher share of temporary employment, lower tenure and wage penalties. As 
expected, non-standard contracts and job instability were also relatively high for academics in 
this logic (socio-cultural professionals), while wages were comparable to other high-skill 
groups. Deviating from the initial expectations, skilled services do not significantly differ 
from skilled crafts when it comes to non-standard contracts and tenure, but they do feature a 
much higher spread of low-wage employment than other medium-skilled groups. 
The analysis has also shown that the manufacturing sector (technical work logic), although 
being relatively stable, is not as homogeneous as it used to be in the industrial era, when 
strong unions ensured relatively favourable employment conditions also for low-skilled 
workers. This lower tier of industrial employment has turned into a quite flexible segment 
with increasing differences to the medium and top tier. Arguably, institutional reforms 
asymmetrically de-regulating agency work and fixed-term contracts have contributed to this 
development: since few firm-specific skills are involved in the lower tier, employers face few 
transaction costs hiring these workers on a temporary basis. 
The various empirical pieces presented in the analysis add up to an argument concerning the 
long-term change of European employment models. As occupational groups feature different 
employment logics, a shift in the occupational composition of the labour market contributes to 
change in the overall model. With some simplification, we observe a process in which more 
traditionally functioning groups are crowded out by more destandardised ones. The upshot of 
this observation is that if we want to understand change in European labour markets, we need 
to ask how different occupational employment patterns can be explained. This paper makes a 
first step in this direction, but there are at least two important tasks for future research on this 
matter. 
The first one lies in exploring in greater detail the role of occupational heterogeneity for 
aggregated labour market outcomes in a comparative perspective. On the one hand, this would 
mean assessing how far the occupational composition of national labour markets affects 
cross-sectional differences. But even more important would be to study the mediating effects 
of different regulatory frameworks on occupational diversity. As shown by the analysis, 
highly flexible occupational groups can coexist with more stability-oriented ones in a given 
regulatory framework. This casts doubt on institutions being the most important explanatory 
variables for different labour market outcomes across countries. In this perspective, it would 
be desirable to analyse interaction between institutions and structural conditions in different 
occupational groups.   19
The second possible direction for future research are in-depth case studies of particular 
occupations establishing causal arguments for diverging labour market patterns. As suggested 
in this paper (without being investigated empirically), these differences can be explained by 
the types of skills and related “stability orientations” of employers. However, on the basis of 
the presented empirical material, this causal argument cannot be evaluated. Qualitative case 
studies explaining labour market outcomes by occupational differences with regard to skills 
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